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Introduction 
ood aid is on the menu at the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) Round of 
World Trade Organisation negotiations. A potential new WTO agreement is 
almost certain to contain rules that will limit the circumstances under which food aid 
will be allowed. The presence of these rules in a WTO agreement is the result of 
pressure from two often diametrically opposed interest groups. The first group is 
comprised of competing exporting nations who believe that food aid displaces 
commercial trade and is a means of disposing of surplus agricultural commodities by 
circumventing export subsidy disciplines. The other group is made up of humanitarian 
advocates; there have been calls for the inclusion of binding humanitarian objectives, 
such as minimum food aid donation requirements, in a WTO agreement since the 
Marrakech Agreement in 1994.  
Negotiating parties at the DDA table are now walking a fine line, trying to create 
food aid rules that will satisfy both competing agricultural exporters and humanitarian 
advocates without alienating either group. This might be too narrow a line to walk, 
however, and new DDA disciplines on food aid may stumble and not satisfy either 
group.  
This article provides an overview of the WTO’s current involvement in the 
international governance of food aid deliveries and outlines the most recent DDA 
proposals for binding food aid rules. The potential effects of these rules on food aid 
policies and shipments are assessed, considering both the direct impacts of food aid 
rules and the indirect impacts of other components of a new DDA deal on food aid 
shipments. New rules on export subsidies and export credit guarantees are particularly 
relevant to this analysis, as these two forms of export competition policy have 
historically been used to dispose of surplus agricultural commodities. This analysis is 
conducted within the context of changing policies (shrinking cereal stocks and an 
expanding biofuel industry) that are unrelated to WTO-agreement adherence.  
Close analysis of the DDA proposals suggests that new rules are not likely to have 
significant effects on food aid shipments. The proposals that appear in each successive 
WTO draft proposal are less restrictive than the last, and any rules that do make it 
through to a final deal are likely to be faced with enforcement and credibility issues. 
This article also discusses the prospect of DDA collapse and outlines alternative 
venues for international governance of food aid.  
Looking Back at Food Aid in the WTO 
gricultural exporters have long been dissatisfied with international efforts to 
curtail the use of food aid as a tool of surplus disposal and to curb its potential 
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to displace commercial trade in recipient countries. This dates back to the United 
Nations’ Food and Agricultural Organisation’s (FAO) convention of the Consultative 
Subcommittee on Surplus Disposal (CSSD) in 1954, an effort to monitor member 
countries’ food aid practices. There are two key principles that govern the CSSD. The 
first is the maintenance of Usual Marketing Requirements (UMRs) in aid-recipient 
countries. UMRs are an attempt to ensure that food aid provides wholly additional 
consumption; that is, food aid should not displace commercial imports. UMRs are 
operationalised by comparing current-year commercial food imports (net of food aid) 
to a five-year historical average. If current-year imports fall below the average, then 
food aid is presumed to have displaced commercial trade and UMRs are not satisfied. 
The second core principle is that donor countries are to notify the CSSD of all food 
aid shipments. This principle has gone largely unfulfilled, as the share of aid reported 
to the CSSD has been trending down since its inception (figure 1).
1 Two important 
points are worth making about the CSSD. First, the CSSD does not have a 
humanitarian agenda; it is intended as an oversight body for the disposition of 




Source: FAO, 2003 
Figure 1 Share of Global Food Aid Flows Reported to the CSSD (%) 
 
Food aid made its first appearance as part of an international trade agreement during 
the Kennedy Round trade negotiations in 1967. The International Grains Agreement 
was negotiated under the auspices of the Kennedy Round and included the parallel 
Food Aid Convention (FAC). The FAC is a non-enforceable agreement among 
signatory donor countries for minimum annual food aid donations; it has been 
renewed several times over the past 40 years. The current FAC has been extended to   R. Cardwell 
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July 2008 in the hope that the DDA negotiations will be completed before a new 
convention has to be convened. 
The FAC has an explicit development agenda. Its primary directive is to ensure 
delivery of sufficient volumes of food aid, as determined by the FAC’s members at 
the time of its drafting (the current convention was drafted in 1999). The convention 
spells out minimum donation requirements for each of its eight donor members and 
specifies a list of acceptable commodities. Article IX of the FAC defers to the FAO’s 
“Principles of Surplus Disposal and Consultative Obligations” as a nod to averting 
commercial displacement; however, the convention’s purpose is humanitarian, not 
commercial.  
Binding rules on agricultural trade were first brought into the WTO with the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA). The URAA contains binding 
rules on market access and domestic support, as well as disciplines on export 
competition. Article 10 in the URAA’s export competition pillar reveals member 
countries’ belief that food aid has been used as a tool of surplus disposal, and it 
provides guidelines that signatories are to follow in an effort to prevent the use of food 
aid as a means of circumventing export subsidy restrictions. The first of these 
guidelines calls for food aid to be untied; that is, aid should not be dependent on 
procurement from a specific country (usually the donor) or group of countries. This 
guideline has been widely flouted by donor countries. A mere 12 to 15 percent of food 
aid is untied, using the definition of “tied aid” employed by the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (Clay, 2006). Canada has recently changed 
its procurement policy to allow 50 percent of its food aid budget to be spent on 
purchases from a list of eligible developing countries, and the 2007 U.S. Farm Bill 
may increase procurement flexibility for some types of U.S. aid. While still officially 
“tied” (because there is a list of eligible source countries), these policy changes 
represent movements towards the spirit of the URAA food aid principles. 
The second URAA guideline defers to the FAO’s “Principles of Surplus Disposal 
and Consultative Obligations”. This guideline calls for the maintenance of UMRs and 
the reporting of aid shipments. This last guideline has generally been ignored by 
signatories, as discussed above. The third guideline calls for food aid to be provided in 
grant form, as opposed to sold under credit or subsidy arrangements. Most donors 
comply with this guideline, with the notable exception of the United States, which 
provides up to 20 percent of its food aid on concessional terms (Young, 2002).  
The URAA guidelines on food aid stand apart from the rest of the URAA because 
they are not enforceable. The guidelines are provided with the hope that member 
countries will abide by them in good faith; those donors who do not comply with the   R. Cardwell 
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URAA guidelines are not subject to trade retaliation under the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Understanding.  
The URAA negotiations produced enforceable disciplines on agricultural export 
subsidies in an effort to curtail the use of this primary outlet for commodity surpluses. 
Article 9 of the URAA committed member countries to bound levels of export 
subsidies, measured in both quantity and value, and instituted schedules of reduction 
over a six-year implementation period. The base period at which subsidies were bound 
was 1986 to 1990, which was a period of high export subsidies. The bound levels of 
subsidies were so high that the constraint was not typically binding and there was 
substantial “water” (unused allowable subsidies) in the disciplines. Despite the 
headroom that countries have had available to them, the use of export subsidies has 
declined significantly in recent years. The United States has phased out the Export 
Enhancement Program and only applies export subsidies to dairy products, while the 
EU has reduced intervention prices and purchases (Rude and Meilke, 2006). 
The URAA, though calling for new disciplines, does not contain binding rules on 
export credits. As such, there remains relatively undisciplined access to three primary 
vents for surplus agricultural commodities (export credits, food aid and storage) under 
the current agreement. 
The URAA has not had significant effects on food aid shipments. Disciplines that 
were aimed at food aid shipments were not binding and did not affect donor policies. 
Some food aid is still tied and there were no restrictions placed on situations under 
which food aid would be allowed. Export credits were not disciplined, so there was no 
added pressure on food aid to dispose of commodity surpluses that would otherwise 
have been sold under government credit guarantee programs. The effect of export 
subsidy reductions on food aid was likely negligible; there would not have been a 
large increase in the pressure to vent surplus commodity stocks as food aid because 
subsidy limits were not always binding.
2 
Looking Forward at Food Aid in the WTO 
he DDA negotiations have included lengthy discussions on food aid rules, and it 
appears as though a new deal will contain binding disciplines on aid shipments. 
But before outlining these disciplines, it is important to note that the inclusion of food 
aid rules in a WTO agreement is the result of competing objectives, and these 
competing objectives may prevent new rules from satisfying anybody. On one hand, 
the DDA is referred to as the Doha Development Agenda, implying that one of the 
primary motivations of member nations is to establish a trading environment that 
benefits developing countries. Furthermore, many developing countries argue that 
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they did not receive the improved market access promised them in the URAA in 
return for agreeing to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property (Cardwell and Kerr, 2008). New rules on food aid are likely to tread 
carefully so as to not jeopardise legitimately needed food aid. This would further 
alienate developing-country members and draw negative public attention to the WTO.  
On the other hand, the belief that food aid is used as a tool of surplus disposal and 
can displace commercial imports is widely held among WTO member countries, and 
negotiating parties appear determined to address this concern in a new DDA deal. A 
set of draft guidelines has emerged from DDA negotiations; these guidelines attempt 
to walk the fine line between restricting the use of aid as a tool of surplus disposal and 
ensuring that legitimate aid is not impeded. However, the current proposals lean more 
towards a commercial agreement than a multilateral humanitarian agreement. Initial 
discussions regarding minimum donation requirements as reflected in the Marrakech 
Agreement no longer appear in WTO draft documents or reference papers. 
Furthermore, the draft modalities of July 2007 illustrate the difficulty that member 
countries have encountered in reaching an agreement on food aid disciplines. Early 
proposals, such as the guidelines in the URAA (e.g., untying food aid) and earlier 
DDA draft modalities (e.g., phasing out in-kind aid), no longer appear in WTO 
documents. This suggests that such proposals were abandoned in an effort to generate 
a consensus and move the agreement more towards a commercial agreement and 
further from a humanitarian understanding. The current proposals are less restrictive 
but indicate that there will be some efforts to discipline international food aid 
shipments.  
The most concrete proposal (i.e., the one with the fewest square brackets) to arise is 
the creation of a “safe box” for emergency food aid. Any aid that meets the safe-box 
criteria would be exempt from export competition disciplines, akin to “green box” 
programs for domestic support. The stumbling block for this proposal, however, is 
determining under what circumstances food aid would qualify for the safe box. There 
appears to be great hesitancy on the part of WTO negotiators to venture into the 
assessment of a food emergency, and negotiators acknowledge that the WTO’s 
expertise is in commercial trade, not in humanitarian and development assistance 
(WTO, 2007a). As such, it appears as though the WTO would defer to humanitarian 
and development organisations for the declaration and assessment of food 
emergencies. The current proposal is that a declaration of an emergency by either the 
affected region’s government or the United Nations would trigger safe-box food aid. 
There is some debate about what agencies and organisations, beyond those two 
entities, would have standing in the assessment of a food emergency. It appears as   R. Cardwell 
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though a set list of eligible multilateral organisations and a few major non-
governmental organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
will be developed. 
The proposed safe box also requires that an assessment of need be undertaken by 
either a relevant United Nations agency or the International Committee of the Red 
Cross. An allowance is likely to be made for aid that is delivered before a needs 
assessment, pending an assessment within three months of the initial delivery. This 
assessment would establish both the merit of the appeal for aid and the duration for 
which such aid could be considered “safe” and non-actionable.  
Non-emergency food aid shipments are also under the microscope at the DDA 
negotiations. Documents that appeared early in DDA negotiations (WTO, 2006c) 
aimed for the elimination of all donor country–sourced in-kind
3 non-emergency aid 
and the phasing out of monetised food aid.
4 Monetised food aid is a target for both 
commercial trade and developmental objectives. Competing exporters argue that 
monetised food aid is not additional consumption and necessarily displaces either 
commercial imports or domestic production, or both. Development advocates argue 
that monetised food aid can depress local food prices and generate disincentives for 
local producers because it is untargeted.
5 This phenomenon has been observed 
empirically by Donovan et al. (1999) and by Barrett, Mohapatra and Snyder (1999). 
The elimination of donor country–sourced in-kind aid and monetised aid has met with 
resistance, however, and these proposals have been watered down in subsequent 
negotiations. Agricultural exporters (chiefly the United States
6) appear to be 
determined to hang on to donor country–sourced in-kind commodity donations as an 
option. The elimination of monetised aid has also raised the ire of some non-
governmental aid agencies, many of whom rely on the proceeds from monetised aid to 
fund development and humanitarian projects (Young and Abbott, 2005).
7 The most 
recent July 2007 proposals call for monetised aid to be limited to situations that 
generate funds that finance the delivery of food to targeted groups or the procurement 
of agricultural inputs. All monetisation is to occur under the auspices of the United 
Nations and the recipient country’s government. 
Despite the term “development” in the DDA, the real debate over food aid is taking 
place among donor countries. This is congruous with the FAC, in which food aid 
guidelines have been determined by donor countries, with no formal standing for 
recipient countries. The WTO’s membership, however, includes several countries that 
are frequent recipients of food aid, and the requirement of consensus for a WTO 
agreement means that any one of these member countries could derail negotiations.   R. Cardwell 
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This has not occurred, and most food aid–recipient countries have voiced general 
agreement with the current proposals. 
A joint submission (WTO, 2006a) by African and least-developed countries (LDCs, 
a group of countries that make up a large share of global food aid recipients) on food 
aid reveals broad consent on most food aid proposals. It appears as though potential 
recipient countries are satisfied that the safe-box approach will not impede 
legitimately needed emergency food aid. African and LDC proposals on non-
emergency food aid are also very similar to the most recent proposals (WTO, 2007b). 
One interesting difference is that the 2007 proposals open the door wider for 
monetisation of food aid (discussed above) than is proposed by the African and LDC 
submission. 
The G-20 group of developing countries has also issued a set of comments on food 
aid disciplines (WTO, 2006b). The G-20 countries concur that the WTO should defer 
the pronouncement of an emergency to a specialised body and also call for the 
phasing out of in-kind non-emergency donations in an effort to avoid commercial 
displacement and local production disincentive effects. Comments from the G-20 
countries also emphasise the importance of tightening food aid notification 
requirements. Reporting of aid shipments will have to increase beyond the levels 
illustrated in figure 1 if WTO disciplines are to be effective. 
Food aid disciplines fall under the DDA’s export competition provisions, and this is 
testament to the concern that negotiating parties have about food aid being used as an 
alternative outlet for the disposal of surplus agricultural commodities. In fact, the 
tightening of export subsidy and export credit disciplines was the primary motivation 
for member countries to negotiate the inclusion of enforceable food aid disciplines in 
the DDA. The notion that disposing of commodity surpluses as food aid can lead to 
commercial displacement is widely accepted among WTO member countries, and the 
July 2007 draft modalities contain specific reference to rules that will “ensure the 
elimination of commercial displacement caused by food aid.” It is therefore worth 
discussing the directions that export subsidy and credit disciplines might take in a 
DDA. 
The DDA negotiations have included ambitious proposals on disciplining 
agricultural export subsidies and export credits. The agenda for export subsidies is 
clear: member countries intend to eliminate agricultural export subsidies over an 
implementation period, finishing by 2013. The most recent correspondence from the 
WTO’s Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture reveals some debate over whether 
required cuts will be based on volume or value, but the end result appears   R. Cardwell 
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unambiguous – a reduction in, and eventual elimination of, the quantity of 
commodities shipped under export subsidies.  
The debate over export credits is less clear. The intention of many negotiating 
parties is to eliminate the subsidy element from officially supported export credits; 
however, the means by which to achieve this goal is as yet uncertain. The July 2007 
modalities outline several key objectives, including 1) requiring repayment terms of 
less than 180 days; 2) requiring payment of a minimum interest rate; 3) requiring 
premiums to cover the risk of non-repayment; and 4) requiring a credit program to be 
self financing. An export credit program that is outside of these disciplines would be 
considered an export subsidy and would have to be eliminated by 2013.  
Special and differential treatment for developing countries is also being addressed. 
Developing countries that provide export credits will be subject to longer 
implementation periods and repayment schedules. There are also likely to be 
allowances for export credits that do not meet with the aforementioned criteria (i.e., a 
special allowance for credits with a subsidy element) in emergency situations. 
Specifically, “Members may provide ... export credits that are not otherwise in 
conformity with the terms of conditions of paragraph 3.4(b) to (g)” in exceptional 
circumstances (WTO, 2007b).  
There are several important obstacles to a resolution of the negotiations over export 
credits. First, there are inherent difficulties in establishing the subsidy element of an 
export credit program. Thompson (2007) points out that the appropriate benchmark 
against which to compare an export credit’s subsidy element is far from clear. 
Thompson also notes that allowing export credits (that would otherwise be prohibited) 
to developing countries in emergencies or times of liquidity constraints undermines 
the principles of a potential deal; Thompson further suggests that such credits should 
only be allowed if they adhere to the FAC’s requirements of concessionality.
8 A 
simpler and more logical solution to the special and differential treatment issue would 
be to require such food aid to be provided in grant form and notified as food aid. The 
chair’s communication paper states that exceptions to export credit disciplines could 
be made in the event that “... the importing developing country requests them” (WTO, 
2007a). This condition bears a striking resemblance to the requirements for 
emergency food aid (which is to be 100 percent grant) to qualify for the safe box (i.e., 
an appeal from the recipient country). 
Effects on Food Aid Shipments 
hat effects might a DDA deal have on food aid shipments? There are three 
major considerations: the direct effects of food aid disciplines; the indirect  W   R. Cardwell 
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effects of changes in export subsidy and export credit disciplines; and changes to 
domestic support programs that result from a DDA deal. 
1. Direct Effects of Food Aid Disciplines 
If all of the disciplines that have been proposed in negotiations thus far were 
implemented and enforced, then food aid shipments would fall, ceteris paribus. The 
safe box would limit the circumstances under which emergency food aid would be 
allowed, and the proposed disciplines on in-kind and monetised food aid would 
sharply reduce aid shipments. 
The prospects for the success of these rules are affected by two factors. First, it 
seems unlikely that all of the current proposals will meet with unanimous agreement 
from member countries; such an agreement is required for a WTO deal to be done. 
There is resistance from the United States on increasing the flexibility of food aid 
procurement policies. Specifically, U.S. policy requires that most of its food aid be 
sourced domestically and shipped as in-kind aid. Though donor-sourced food aid may 
sometimes be the best option, there is a desire on the part of aid agencies to undertake 
local and triangular purchases in circumstances that would allow for faster and 
cheaper food aid procurement. Progress has been slow on this front, and a more likely 
result is that in-kind aid will be allowed only when based on a needs assessment by a 
third party and when targeted to vulnerable groups (WTO, 2007b). It is worth noting, 
however, that the most recent proposals for the 2007 U.S. Farm Bill suggest allowing 
25 percent of Title II food aid funding to be used for locally or triangularly sourced 
food aid. 
There is also resistance to eliminating monetised aid, and the most recent proposals 
for disciplines on monetised aid include square brackets around the divergent 
alternatives of a) prohibiting monetisation except under specific circumstances or b) 
encouraging members to “endeavour to constrain [monetisation]” (WTO, 2007b). The 
latter possibility implies that no binding rules would be placed on monetisation, and 
the practice could continue unabated. The wide gap between these two alternatives 
intimates that any disciplines on monetisation will fall somewhere in the middle.  
Second, despite the presence of binding food aid rules within the WTO’s single 
Dispute Settlement Understanding, it may be unrealistic to expect a violation of a food 
aid discipline to be pursued and enforced with the same vigour as would a violation of 
another article of the Agreement on Agriculture or any other WTO agreement. 
Consider a situation in which a donor country made a bilateral donation of food aid to 
a recipient country or region without an ex ante formal appeal from a WTO-accredited 
agency. If such aid did not conform to safe-box criteria, then another country 
(presumably a competing exporter) could instigate a trade case through the WTO’s   R. Cardwell 
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Dispute Settlement Body in pursuit of restitution for lost exports. The case would 
involve the offended member country requesting negotiations with the donor and, 
failing the resolution of the dispute through negotiations, procession to a WTO panel. 
If a panel were to rule in favour of the complaining country then the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Body would authorise retaliatory trade sanctions in the amount of trade 
lost as a result of the food aid donation.  
It is difficult to envision a situation in which such a complaint would be followed 
through to the stage of retaliatory trade actions. The April 2007 communication from 
Chairman Falconer suggests that it is not “humanly conceivable that action [donation 
of food aid] would be withheld, pending ideal processes [a formal appeal] to work 
their way through” (WTO, 2007a). This presumably means that aid delivered without 
being approved as “safe box” would require ex post notification, to be subsequently 
judged on its merits. Despite the fact that the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure 
does not provide official intervener status for non-governmental organisations, there is 
discretion for a panel to consider opinions beyond the relevant member countries 
(Trebilcock and Howse, 1999). It would be easy for a donor country to locate a group 
of people who could attest to the need for the controversial aid shipment, even if such 
a group were not on the WTO-approved list of non-governmental organisations. 
Another important factor is that the WTO’s reputation is already sullied among 
civil-society humanitarian advocates, and a case that brought retaliatory trade 
penalties against a food aid donor might only worsen public perceptions of the WTO’s 
agreements. These problems combine to greatly diminish any credibility that WTO-
endorsed food aid rules would carry with member countries. 
DDA negotiators have wisely backed away from including specific and binding 
humanitarian objectives in food aid disciplines. The Marrakech Decision of 1996 
mentioned negotiations to ensure sufficient food aid donations, and there have been 
calls to link rules on food aid with minimum donor commitments (Young, 2002). But 
the WTO agreements are ill equipped to enforce such rules and there would be 
practical problems with bringing humanitarian and developmental objectives within 
the confines of a commercial trade agreement. The WTO agreements are based on the 
assumption that distortions from free trade harm everyone (in the form of reduced 
consumers’ welfare) except a small group of import-competing producers. As such, 
WTO agreements are not equipped to accommodate complaints from anyone other 
than producer groups who feel that they have been harmed by the actions of another 
member country or a firm therein (Kerr, 2004). There is no mechanism to hear 
complaints from humanitarian advocates about the effectiveness or legitimacy of food 
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Kerr (2004) describes a similar phenomenon as the “capture” of the WTO by groups 
that are not traditional protectionists. Such groups include consumer groups (e.g, 
opposed to growth hormones in beef production) and environmentalists (e.g., 
concerned about dolphin-unfriendly tuna catches) who seek to limit market access for 
products to which they object. The key issue with these types of complaints is that the 
WTO has no mechanism to adjudicate on complaints from groups other than rent-
seeking producer groups.  
The situation is even more complicated in the case of food aid guidelines. In the case 
of dolphin-unfriendly tuna catches, there is the potential (if the WTO were equipped 
to adjudicate on such a complaint) for retaliatory trade actions – presumably tariffs on 
imports from the country that houses the offending producer into the country that 
houses the complainant. But what if a member country were to violate its food aid 
obligations, as outlined in a new WTO agreement? If the violation were to involve an 
aid shipment that displaced commercial trade from a competing exporter, then the 
traditional dispute settlement procedure could be followed and there would be scope 
for retaliatory trade measures from the competing exporter. If the violation were of a 
different form, however, then two things are unclear: 1) who would bring the 
complaint and 2) if a violation of rules were established, then who would retaliate? A 
WTO-enforced minimum food aid donation requirement would be the prime example 
of this problem. Retaliatory trade sanctions are welfare reducing for the country 
implementing the sanctions, so the incentives for any one country to impose sanctions 
on an offending member do not exist. It is difficult to envision any one WTO member 
country seeking to reduce its own welfare by requesting the authority to impose trade 
sanctions against another member country that did not fulfil its minimum donation 
commitment. 
Another complication arises in the event that a non-governmental organisation 
violates new WTO rules on food aid shipments. The target for WTO sanctions is clear 
in the case of an actionable bilateral food aid shipment – the donor country. However 
if a non-governmental organisation were to break a food aid discipline by, for 
example, monetising an aid shipment to raise funds for a project unrelated to food 
distribution, then against whom would trade sanctions apply? It is conceivable that the 
host country of the non-governmental organisation could bear the sanctions, but what 
of truly multinational organisations such as CARE or the Mennonite Central 
Committee? The practical difficulty in such a case, combined with the almost certain 
public outcry that would accompany WTO-endorsed sanctions, greatly reduces the 
credibility that WTO-enforced food aid rules would hold.    R. Cardwell 
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Given the credibility issues that food aid rules in a DDA deal could face, it may 
come down to member countries abiding by the agreement as a matter of good faith; 
specifically, a hope that member countries will abide by the rules simply because they 
have been agreed to, not because they will be enforced. This bodes poorly for the 
future of food aid rules in a WTO agreement. The impetus for bringing food aid rules 
under the auspices of the WTO was that voluntary guidelines through the FAC and the 
CSSD were not followed in good faith. It is likely that the food aid disciplines in the 
current DDA proposals will have very little impact on food aid shipments. 
2. Indirect Effects of Export Subsidy and Export Credit Disciplines 
Successful completion of a DDA deal will include new restrictions on export credit 
arrangements and tighter constraints on export subsidies. Though the magnitude of the 
mandated decrease is yet to be determined, the result will be a decrease in the volumes 
of commodities that are shipped under export credit arrangements and export 
subsidies. There is concern this reduction will lead to an increase in food aid 
shipments as surplus disposal. Were it not for other confounding factors, this might be 
the case, and surplus agricultural commodities could be vented as food aid. However, 
two important factors must be considered in analysing the relationship between 
surplus disposal and food aid. First, public U.S. government grain stocks have been 
shrinking for the past several years (figure 2), due in large part to the loan deficiency 
payment program. This program provides farmers with the option of accepting a 
deficiency payment that covers the difference between the loan rate and the market 
rate for their crops, in lieu of forfeiting their crops to the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA). This program has tempered the USDA’s acquisition of grain 
stocks. The pressure to unload commodity surpluses in the United States is not as 
strong as it once was, because the volume of surplus public grain stocks is shrinking. 
Lower intervention prices in the EU have reduced the need for export subsidies, so 
new binding rules on export subsidies may not put upward pressure on EU food aid 
shipments either.    R. Cardwell 
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Source: USDA, 2006a 
Figure 2 Wheat Stocks (millions of bushels) 
 
A second factor is the ramping up of biofuel production in the United States. Most 
biofuel in the United States is corn-based ethanol, and the rapid increase in ethanol 
production is expected to tighten the market for livestock feed grains over the coming 
years. As more corn is used in biofuel production, other crops are expected to be 
pushed into the feed market to make up for reduced corn availability. Wheat will fill 
part of this role, further reducing wheat stocks. A study by Elobeid et al. (2006) 
projects a long-run increase in the use of U.S. feed wheat from 150 million bushels to 
283 million bushels in response to an expanded biofuel industry. This will further 
deplete wheat stocks and decrease pressure for disposal of surplus grain.  
New export competition rules could increase pressure on food aid as an outlet for the 
disposal of commodity surpluses, ceteris paribus. However, the surpluses from which 
these shipments will be drawn will be smaller than in years past. Shrinking public 
stocks in the United States combined with the tightening effect of biofuel production 
on grain markets mean that the option of disposing of commodity surpluses as food 
aid will not be as pressing as it once was to policy makers (particularly in the United 
States). The indirect effects of tighter export competition rules from a new DDA are 
likely to be small.  
3. Indirect Effects of Domestic Support Reform 
A third consideration is the impact of a DDA deal on domestic support programs 
that create the commodity surpluses from which much food aid is drawn. Despite up 
to one-third of U.S. food aid shipments being drawn directly from the USDA’s public 
stocks (USDA, 2006b), changes to rules on domestic support are unlikely to 
significantly affect food aid shipments. Surplus commodity stocks are no longer the   R. Cardwell 
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important drivers of food aid shipments as in years past. Also, current proposals for 
reform of domestic programs suggest that binding constraints on the United States and 
EU are unlikely to materialise. Brink (2006) points out that current proposals, 
including those espoused by the EU, will be ineffective in reducing domestic support. 
Production of the commodity surpluses from which food aid is extracted may not be 
heavily impacted. 
What will be the effect of a DDA deal on food aid shipments, considering the 
possible effects of the three factors discussed above? Explicit rules on food aid that 
attempt to restrict the conditions under which food aid is allowed would be difficult to 
enforce and may not be credible among member countries. It is difficult to envision a 
case of retaliatory trade sanctions against a food aid donor. Member countries might 
abide by the proposed disciplines, but this would more likely be due to good faith than 
to coercion from a new DDA agreement. This scenario is not promising; there are 
already food aid guidelines and “good faith” suggestions in the URAA to which 
member countries do not adhere. Export subsidy and export credit disciplines are 
likely to be more credible than those on food aid and could push a larger share of 
commodity surpluses into food aid channels. However, these stocks are shrinking with 
time and are likely to contract even faster with the expansion of biofuel production. 
Current proposals on domestic support do not appear aggressive and may not 
substantively affect donor-country surpluses. The primary motivation for negotiating a 
food aid component into the DDA was to avoid commercial displacement that could 
arise from disposal of surplus commodities, but as these surpluses contract this 
concern becomes less imperative. It may be a case of applying more pressure to 
smaller surpluses, with negligible results. 
The collapse, or long-term hibernation, of the DDA is also a possibility. If 
negotiators cannot make significant progress over the coming months, then WTO 
negotiations may be suspended indefinitely. The U.S. Trade Promotion Authority has 
expired, and there will be a presidential election in 2009. If a deal is not done in short 
order, then there may not be scope for a new deal until as late as 2010 (Evenett, 2007). 
The implementation period for Uruguay Round disciplines on export subsidies is past, 
and there will be no new constraints imposed on their use without a DDA agreement. 
Donor countries would retain export subsidies as an option for surplus disposal, 
subject to URAA limits. Export credits would remain a second option for disposing of 
surplus commodities. The upshot is that increased pressure that the DDA might have 
placed on food aid as a vent for surplus disposal would not materialise. 
There would also be no binding rules on food aid if a DDA deal does not 
materialise. The proposed safe box for emergency food aid would not emerge and   R. Cardwell 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy    89
donor countries would not be subject to enforceable disciplines. The governance of 
international food aid would fall to another organisation. 
Alternative Venues 
f the scenario described above unfolds and the WTO does not develop formal food 
aid rules in the near term, then what are the prospects of an alternative venue 
developing new food aid guidelines? There may be room for another multilateral 
organisation to put forward some new rules on food aid. The current Food Aid 
Convention expires in July of 2008 and is an obvious venue. 
While the DDA is a commercial agreement that pays lip service to humanitarian 
objectives, the FAC is the opposite: a multinational humanitarian accord that pays lip 
service to commercial concerns by making reference to UMRs. A renegotiated FAC 
would therefore approach food aid disciplines from a very different perspective than 
does the WTO. Three of the key negotiating points at the Trans-Atlantic Food Aid 
Policy Dialogue
9 are minimum donation requirements from donor members (in 
quantity of food, not value), harmonisation of reporting requirements with WTO 
agreements, and the continued monetisation of food aid. The effectiveness of the FAC 
is constrained, however, by its nature as a voluntary, non-binding agreement. Non-
binding agreements on food aid have a chequered past; for example, low rates of 
reportage to the CSSD and the failure of countries (Canada and the United States) to 
meet their FAC minimum donation requirements. Such failures provided the 
incentives for humanitarian advocates to support the inclusion of binding rules on 
food aid in the WTO – to coerce member nations to change their behaviour by threat 
of retaliation from WTO member countries. Another important factor is that countries 
may be less willing to make concessions on their food aid policies outside the 
reciprocal deal-making environment of the WTO negotiations. The United States, 
which favours the status quo, may be unwilling to compromise without gaining 
concessions from other member countries in other trade-related areas (e.g., market 
access and export subsidies). 
It is likely that a new FAC will be negotiated, and it will bear some resemblance to 
previous FACs. Whether member countries abide by the new convention remains to 
be seen; however, it is likely that some of a new convention’s guidelines will be 
followed more closely than in the past. This is due as much to gradual changes in 
donor behaviour as to explicit efforts to conform to FAC directives. Most donor 
nations are moving away from monetised aid, and tying is becoming less prevalent in 
food aid donations. 
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Conclusions 
f a new WTO deal is completed, then it will contain binding rules on food aid 
shipments in an effort to curtail displacement of commercial trade in food-aid 
recipient countries. The new rules will mark a departure from the URAA’s non-
binding food aid guidelines; member countries that violate the new rules will be 
subject to trade retaliation under the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding. If the 
current proposals make it through to a final DDA agreement and are enforced as 
outlined in draft modalities, then food aid shipments will decline. There are two 
factors that will prevent this from happening, however. First, any rules that appear in a 
DDA deal will be difficult to enforce and will face serious credibility issues among 
member nations. Adherence of member-country food aid policies to new rules in a 
WTO agreement may be a matter of good faith. Second, many of the issues that the 
new rules are intended to address are not as prevalent as in years past. Specifically, 
monetisation is already on the wane and surplus disposal is less prevalent because 
commodity stocks are shrinking. 
If the DDA collapses, then the international governance of food aid will fall to 
another body – likely one without an effective enforcement mechanism. A new FAC 
is likely to emerge with or without a DDA deal and will contain guidelines for 
signatory countries to increase the effectiveness of food aid from a recipient-country 
perspective. A new FAC would not have binding, enforceable rules but might be as 
effective in promoting its agenda as would be weak rules in a WTO agreement. 
I   R. Cardwell 
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Endnotes 
                                                      
*   The author thanks James Rude and C. Stuart Clark for helpful comments on 
earlier drafts of this article. 
1.   The jump in 2003 is the result of the U.S. reporting four years of aid in one 
year. 
2.   There is anecdotal evidence that an increase in U.S. skimmed milk powder 
food aid shipments corresponded with mandated reductions in export subsidies 
over the implementation period (Margulis, 2006). 
3.   There is considerable confusion about the food aid terms used at the WTO. The 
widely understood terms for food aid sources are donor-sourced (coming from 
donor-country production), local purchase (purchased in the recipient country) 
and regional or triangular purchase (purchased in a third, usually developing, 
country). In development circles there is also a debate about food transfers 
(traditional food aid) and cash transfers (where money is given to recipients to 
buy their own food). WTO use of the term “in-kind” refers to the first source of 
food aid while the term “cash-based” applies to the second and third sources.   R. Cardwell 
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Cash transfers (which could also be understood as “cash-based”) are not part of 
the WTO discussions. 
4.   Monetised aid is in-kind food aid that is donated and then sold on the recipient 
country’s market. 
5.   These effects are commonly referred to as “Schultzian disincentive effects”, 
after Nobel laureate Theodore Schultz (1960). 
6.   The U.S. negotiating position has been in favour of continuing current food aid 
disciplines as outlined in Article 10.4 of the URAA (Young, 2002). 
7.   The food aid non-governmental organisation community is not unanimous on 
this point. CARE, a large multinational food aid donor, intends to unilaterally 
phase out monetization by 2009. 
8.   The FAC requires that food aid be provided at a minimum of 80 percent 
concessionality and that concessional aid comprise a maximum of 20 percent of 
a donor’s food aid provision. 
9.   The Trans-Atlantic Food Aid Policy Dialogue is an informal network of food 
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